Link West - India, GCC, Iran and Iraq speech by the Vice President of India, Shri M. Hamid Ansari
India has a vital stake in peace and stability in
this sub-region and in the security of the sea lanes connecting it to the
outside world: Shri M. Hamid Ansari
Addresses International Relations Conference ‘Link West - India, GCC, Iran and Iraq’
Addresses International Relations Conference ‘Link West - India, GCC, Iran and Iraq’
The Vice President
of India, Shri M. Hamid Ansari has said that India has a vital stake in peace
and stability in this sub-region and in the security of the sea lanes
connecting it to the outside world. He was addressing the International
Relations Conference ‘Link West - India, GCC, Iran and Iraq’ at Symbiosis
International University, Pune today which was attended by the Governor of
Maharashtra, Shri Chennamaneni Vidyasagar Rao, Guardian Minister for Pune,
Government of Maharashtra, Shri Girish Bagpat, Chancellor, Symbiosis
International University, Dr. S.B. Mujumdar, various diplomats from the Gulf
region and other dignitaries.
The Vice President
of India said that peace, stability and security in the Persian Gulf are
critical to global security and prosperity, and establishes a convergence of
local, regional and global interests. He added that the centrality of the
region to global supplies of hydrocarbon energy and to its relevance as an
important destination of exports from major trading nations is evident.
He raised some
questions that need to be addressed which are critical to any discussion of
peace and security in the region. What is the threat perception of individual
countries of the littoral, whether it is internal, or external, or both, is there
a convergence in some of these, is the perceived external threat from within
the region or is it extra-regional, is it physical or ideological, traditional
or Non-Traditional and do extra-regional powers have an interest in disrupting
peace and security in the area.
The Vice President
said that in the past two decades a number of efforts, principally focused on
the GCC, have been made to address security challenges of the region. He added
that any new security agenda should be more inclusive and address not only
military aspects of security, but also issues such as regional economic
development, counter-terrorism, disaster response, and environmental, social
and cultural topics as well. In addition, a more cooperative approach to
inter-state relations as a basis for a new security architecture is called for,
as this is essential to an understanding of security that leaves behind
zero-sum calculations of national security”.
The Vice President
recalled that the Saudi Foreign Minister, Mr. Saud Al Faisal had drawn
attention to “an urgent need for a collective effort aimed at developing a new
and more solid framework for Gulf security” having a national, a regional and
an international component. He opined that once the foundations of a
sustainable dialogue on these matters has been established, and progress made
in search of acceptable responses, a more inclusive security dialogue could be
initiated to identify shared interests and put in place understandings and
procedures to respond to threats to peace and security.
The Vice President
listed the Indian requirement as: (a) friendly regimes and stability in the
littoral states (b) access to the region’s oil and gas resources (c) freedom of
navigation in the Persian Gulf and through the Straits of Hormuz (d) security
of sea lanes and (e) continued access to the markets of the littoral states for
Indian trade, technology, workforce and two-way investments. The Vice President
said that keeping eventualities in mind, prudence suggests the creation and
reinforcement of an autonomous interdiction capacity geared to India’s
requirement of free movement of tankers from the Persian Gulf to India, eschew
marginal roles in Western security arrangements for the Gulf, and lend support,
in principle, to inclusive security arrangements for the future that may be
proposed for discussion.
Following is the text of the Vice President’s address:
“A first reading
of the general theme is somewhat confusing since geographically-speaking there
are several “Gulfs” to the West of India – Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, and
Persian Gulf. Mercifully, the doubt is dispelled on closer reading! The
terminological clarification given by the UN Secretariat in 1999 is somewhat
helpful.
The sub-themes for
participants cover subjects of perennial relevance to governments, strategists,
energy supply and world trade specialists, and the general public.
I propose today to
speak about some aspects of the security scenario since it provides an
overarching perspective to all political, economic and social activities.
The context is
relevant. The Persian Gulf is a body of water 989 kilometers in length and 55
km in width at its narrowest point. Ever since the British withdrawal from the
area in November 1970, the question of the security of the sea lanes for the
flow of hydrocarbon supplies to different destinations in the world has been on
the strategic and tactical agenda of the beneficiaries of these supplies. For
this reason, as noted by a Saudi scholar many years back, “Gulf regional security
was an external issue long before it was an issue among the Gulf states
themselves.”
The centrality of
the region to global supplies of hydrocarbon energy (holding 54% of the world’s
oil reserves and 23% of its gas reserves), and to its relevance as an important
destination of exports from major trading nations, is evident. Thus peace,
stability and security in the area are critical to global security and
prosperity. This establishes a convergence of local, regional and global
interests.
Consequently, some
questions critical to any discussion of peace and security in the region need
to be addressed:
- What is the threat
perception of individual countries of the littoral?
- Is it internal, or
external, or both? Is there a convergence in some of these?
- Is the perceived external
threat from within the region or is it extra-regional?
- Is it physical or
ideological, traditional or Non-Traditional?
- Do extra-regional powers
have an interest in disrupting peace and security in the area?
In
politico-strategic terms, the eight countries of the Persian Gulf littoral are
to be considered in three categories: (i) the six members of the Gulf
Cooperation Council, (ii) Iran and (iii) Iraq. The political systems and
ideological orientations of the six GCC states do not converge with that of
either Iran or Iraq. An obvious consequence is a predilection for exclusive,
rather than inclusive, security.
An early effort to
make the littoral states themselves shoulder the responsibility of peace and
security in the area, made in the Muscat Conference convened by Oman in
November 1975, was not fruitful on account of the conflicting perceptions of
these states. The latter were aggravated following the Iranian Revolution of
1979 and the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War.
In January 1980,
in the context of Cold War and regional considerations, the Carter Doctrine was
promulgated asserting that “any attempt by an outside force to gain control of
the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests
of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any
means necessary, including military force.” It was reiterated later in the year
after the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War: “it is imperative that there be no
infringement of… freedom of passage of ships to and from the Persian Gulf
region.” This approach was sustained through the period of the Iraq-Iran War
though Iraqi attempts to disrupt the outflow of Iranian crude did invite blunt
warnings by Rafsanjani in October 1983 and May 1984. “We would close the
Straits of Hormuz,” he said, “if the Persian Gulf becomes unusable for us. And
if the Persian Gulf becomes unusable for us, we will make the Persian Gulf
unusable for others.”
The formation of
the GCC in 1981 and subsequent efforts to explore GCC-focused collective
security arrangements alongside bilateral ones with external powers made
limited progress in the 1990s. Iran, on its part, proposed in 1994 the
establishment of a forum to discuss threat perceptions and security concerns
amongst the littoral states; this was followed in 1995 by the suggestion of a
non-aggression pact amongst them.
In the past two
decades a number of efforts, principally focused on the GCC, have been made to
address security challenges of the region. These tend to suggest that “ a
return to the status quo ante (e.g. the old realpolitik
balance-of –power approach which depends on the US to guarantee regional
stability) is no longer workable and that in order to overcome regional
challenges, cooperation is needed …(and that) most parties suggest that any new
security agenda should be more inclusive (and) address not only military
aspects of security, but also issues such as regional economic development,
counter-terrorism, disaster response, and environmental, social and cultural
topics as well. In addition, a more cooperative approach to inter-state
relations as a basis for a new security architecture is called for, as this is
essential to an understanding of security that leaves behind zero-sum
calculations of national security.” More specifically, it has been suggested
that “what the Gulf needs is a series of overlapping and bilateral
relationships” on the model of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
In December 2004
Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal drew attention to “an urgent need for a
collective effort aimed at developing a new and more solid framework for Gulf
security” having a national, a regional and an international component. The
national component, he said, involves “the urgent need for comprehensive
reforms in our countries with some variation in the speed of implementation
depending on the individual social conditions”. The regional framework “should
be based on four pillars: the GCC, Yemen, Iran and Iraq” and the international
aspect of it should involve international guarantees, underwritten by the
Security Council, for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity
of all the littoral states. “The international component of the suggested Gulf
security framework should engage positively the emerging Asian powers as well,
especially China and India”.
An evolution in
the perception of the littoral states of the Persian Gulf is thus evident
notwithstanding publicly stated disagreements, laced with atavistic
premonitions, on hardcore security and foreign policy issues. A promising
development has been the resolution of the Iranian nuclear question through the
Iran–P5+1 Joint Comprehensive Plan of action (JCPOA) of April 2, 2015 and the
carefully worded welcome accorded to it in the US – GCC statement of May 14 and
the US – Saudi statement of September 4, 2015. Also to be noted is Qatar’s
recent offer of hosting a GCC-Iran dialogue to address existing disputes that
are “political regional Arab-Iranian difference rather than being a
Sunni-Shiite disputes.”
In this changing
context, the framework proposed earlier could become the basis of discussions
on comprehensive, inclusive, security. To give shape to it, threat perceptions
would need to converge beginning with an enunciation of common threats on
non-political matters like natural or man-made disasters, response to pandemics
and environmental challenges that transcend borders, counter-terrorism, drugs
smuggling, and related matters.
Once the
foundations of a sustainable dialogue on these matters has been established,
and progress made in search of acceptable responses, a more inclusive security
dialogue could be initiated to identify shared interests and put in place
understandings and procedures to respond to threats to peace and security.
Doubts and misgivings are nevertheless likely to persist since, as the old
proverb put it, “the wound of words is worse than the wound of swords.”
A critical
impediment to any cooperative security arrangement to be entered into by the
littoral states relates to the presence of foreign forces. The position of the
United States, spelt out in some detail in the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Report of June 19, 2012, has been reiterated in the recent
announcements made with the GCC states. Iran, on the other hand, has hitherto
stressed that the region “be free of trans-regional powers.” This impediment
can only be overcome if the circle is widened and a future arrangement is
premised on the participation of principal users and beneficiaries,
underwritten by an international agreement or convention.
How does the
foregoing impact on India and Indian interests? Some prepositions with regard
to these are self evident:
- Locating the Persian
Gulf, with reference to India, is an exercise in geography and history.
For India, the Persian Gulf littoral is proximate neighbourhood and part
of our natural economic hinterland. The distance from Mumbai to Basra is
1847 nautical miles; it is 1802 to Kuwait, 1630 to Dammam, 1265 to Bander
Abbas and 1046 to Dubai.
- Even before the advent of
modern age and modern means of communication, there was a vibrant trade
between the west coast of India and different points on the Persian Gulf
littoral. This association generated and nurtured people-to-people
contacts cherished on all sides. A good number of proverbs complementary
to India are to be found in the colloquial Arabic of the lower Gulf.
- These ties were sustained
in the colonial period when command of the sea ensured the supremacy of
British power.
- The governments and
public opinion in the littoral states are India-friendly and
Indian-friendly.
- India today receives 65%
of its energy supplies from this region, has an overall trade of 163
billion US dollars, and a work force there of about 8 million whose
remittances amounted to 35 billion US dollars in 2014-15.
- Around 170,000 Indian
pilgrims go to Saudi Arabia every year for the Haj pilgrimage.
In addition, India
and GCC states have initiated important steps to engage with each other
politically and strategically in a more rigorous manner, particularly in regard
to combating terrorism and extremism, supply of narcotics and drugs and
movement of criminal elements. There is also a growing interest in initiating
and strengthening defence ties and the first steps in this regard have been
taken with Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
The GCC States
look at India as a vibrant economy that could be a good destination for
investments, as is evident from the India-UAE statement of August 17, 2015 and
the earlier Delhi and Riyadh Declarations with Saudi Arabia. They view India as
an important player on the global scene, as a large and growing market for
their principal export commodity, and as a possible provider of food security
and trade partner.
Iraq remains an
important source of crude and has the potential for wider economic cooperation
under normal conditions.
The Indian
interest in a multidimensional – strategic and economic - relationship with
Iran, highlighted after President Khatemi’s visit in 2003, remained subdued
until very recently on account of third-country considerations. The current
impetus to rejuvenate these is promising.
For all these
reasons, India has a vital stake in peace and stability in this sub-region and
in the security of the sea lanes connecting it to the outside world. The Indian
requirement is thus fivefold: (a) friendly regimes and stability in the
littoral states (b) access to the region’s oil and gas resources (c) freedom of
navigation in the Persian Gulf and through the Straits of Hormuz (d) security
of sea lanes and (e) continued access to the markets of the littoral states for
Indian trade, technology, workforce and two-way investments.
A first
requirement is to sustain and intensify the bilateral relationships with all
the littoral states of the Gulf littoral. The question of domestic stability is
squarely in the domain of domestic politics of individual states and
suggestions of inputs into it should be eschewed. The other two would best be
achievable in an inclusive security framework underwritten by the international
community through an appropriate mechanism. Together, these would facilitate
the furtherance of the fifth.
Pending this, and
keeping eventualities in mind, prudence suggests the creation and reinforcement
of an autonomous interdiction capacity geared to India’s requirement of free
movement of tankers from the Persian Gulf to India, eschew marginal roles in Western
security arrangements for the Gulf, and lend support, in principle, to
inclusive security arrangements for the future that may be proposed for
discussion.
I wish you all
success in your deliberations.
Jai Hind.”
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